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We re-examine the Lewis undermigration hypothesis by studying a
two-sector model in which there is a trade-off between higher produc-
tivity in the modern sector and better information in the traditional
sector. The consequent presence of well-functioning local insurance
markets in the traditional sector and their absence in the modern sec-
tor leads to the possibility of inefficient undermigration: total social
surplus would be increased if migration were larger than its laissez-
faire level; whether this occurs depends in part on the distribution of
wealth. In a dynamic version of the model, modernization of the econ-
omy may be too slow, and it is possible that the economy gets stuck
in an undermigration trap (never fully modernizes). The migratory
dynamics also lead to wellrdefined dynamic relations between average
income and inequality. We find that although the Kuznets inverted-U
curve may arise, it is equally likely that the relation of inequality and
income follows other patterns, including an upright U.
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1 Introduction
In the fifties and the sixties migration was central to economists' under-
standing of the development process. This was consistent with their overall
view that most underdeveloped economies were dominated by a backward
traditional sector where the rational forces of the market-place had not yet
penetrated. Migration was then not only an engine of, but also a metaphor
for the many processes which lead to the integration of the traditional sector
with modern sector.
Perhaps the most influential study of the actual process of moderniza-
tion was by Kuznets [12]. He studied a number of then-developed countries
and concluded that there was a common pattern in the process of mod-
ernization of these countries. Initially the impact of modernization was to
increase inequality but over time as the economy approached full moderniza-
tion inequality decreases again. This prediction for the pattern of evolution
of inequality is what is known as the Kuznets inverted U-hypothesis.
Kuznets suggested a simple explanation of why one might observe such
a pattern. Assuming that the productivity level in the traditional sector
was below that in the modern sector, he argued that the first impact of
modernization would be to increase inequality, as some of the workers who
used to work in the low productivity traditional sector will now earn higher
wages in the modern sector. Eventually however everyone will earn high
wages in the modern sector and equality will be restored.
This theory takes as exogenous one key ingredient of the migration process
— the rate of migration. The problem is to explain why despite the difference
in wages the integration takes so long. As it turned out, at about the same
time when Kuznets was doing this work Arthur Lewis was developing his very
influential work on the determinants of migration [13]. Lewis was concerned
with the possibility that the rate of migration under laissez-faire may be lower
than optimal because of the nature of certain institutions in the traditional
sector.1 One such institution is the family farm; Lewis assumed that on the
family farm all family members earned an equal share of the output as long as
1This view actually goes back further. Similar arguments were made in the Soviet
Union in the early years of communist rule by Preobrazensky and others in the context of
the debates about what to do with the Kulaks.
they worked there but did not earn anything if they left to work in the modern
sector.2 The private opportunity cost of labor from the farm is therefore
its average product, typically much higher than the social opportunity cost
which is the marginal product. Therefore there will be under-migration.
The Kuznets-Lewis view of the development process and its various ex-
tensions had an immense impact on development thinking till the 70s.3 Since
then, however, it has increasingly come under heavy attack and is now largely
ignored at least by academic economists. The attacks were both about the
micro-foundations of the view and its macro implications. Lewis' theory of
the family farm requires that the farm is organized in an inefficient way. All
family members could be better off if they changed the allocation rule so that
the family member who goes away does not lose his share. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that this is exactly what families do; migration is very much
a family decision and optimization does take place. [5]
On the more macro level, the experience of most countries that have gone
through the development process since Kuznets's paper does not suggest that
the U-curve is in any way universal.4 Studying data from other countries
people have identified inverted J-curves and even non-inverted U-curves.
More broadly the trend in development economics is to take a skeptical
view of whether there is such a thing as a traditional sector in the above-
mentioned sense: indeed, a large body of theoretical and empirical work
has helped to establish that phenomena which were viewed as evidence of
systematic irrationality in the rural sector are in fact rational. If this premise
is granted, the question of integration and modernization would be irrelevant
and migration would be only an issue in urban economics.
Yet it seems almost undeniable, as many social scientists have empha-
sized, that there are important institutional differences between the tradi-
tional and modern sectors, and that nature of the articulation among these
institutions is important for understanding the development process. The
position we take in this paper is an intermediate one which accommodates
the latter view and allows us to try to make some sense of it. We grant that
agents and institutions in the traditional sector are rational in the sense that
they optimize given market prices. We do however maintain that there is a
2For an important early study of the model of the family farm within the context of
this view see [14]
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 Other seminal contributions to this line of research include Fei and Ranis [7] and
Harris and Todaro [10].
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 See Adelman and Robinson [l] and Fields [8], [9] for surveys of the evidence.
difference between the sectors. The difference is two-fold; the modern sector
is indeed more productive, but the traditional sector has institutions which
are in some ways more efficient.
The idea that there may be efficient institutions which are special to the
traditional sector is now becoming increasingly widely accepted. It has been
widely observed that the extended family and neighbors act as a nexus for
the provision of credit and insurance [16], [17]. More recently,5 it has also
become clear from the remarkable repayment rates in Grameen banks and
other collective credit institutions in the rural areas of developing countries,
that this nexus may, under the right conditions, extend beyond family and
immediate neighbors [15], [18]. Even the village money-lender, long viewed
as the classic example of an exploitative institution, is being appreciated for
his contribution to channeling credit to those who would not get it otherwise.
The reason why these institutions may not be transplanted in the modern
sector is that they depend heavily on how life is organized in the traditional
sector. What is important for these institutions to function is that those who
participate in them have better information and a greater ability to inflict
punishment on each other than do outsiders; this derives from the fact that
in the traditional sector people live and work together for generations and
longer.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implications for patterns
of migration and income distribution of this simple trade-off between higher
productivity in the modern sector and more efficient institutions in the tra-
ditional sector. We model the traditional sector institution as a local con-
sumption loan market which acts a kind of insurance for its participants. The
reason this institution can thrive in the traditional sector is that agents there
have good information about each other and can therefore enforce higher re-
payment rates than can their less informed, modern-sector counterparts.
The first result is a direct consequence of this; since those who have less
initial wealth typically need to borrow more, relatively poorer people may
choose to remain in the less productive traditional sector. This is true despite
the fact that if everybody was forcibly moved to the modern sector output
— indeed total social surplus — would be larger. In this sense it is the very
efficiency of the rural credit institution that generates inefficient migration.6
5In terms of academic interest — the actual evidence on the success of credit coop-
eratives in the traditional sector dates back to the German cooperatives of the late 19th
century [3].
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 See [6] for some direct evidence that informal credit and insurance arrangements in
We go on to try to characterize the set of economies where this kind of
under-migration is likely to emerge. What we show is that under-migration is
less likely both in very poor and very inegalitarian economies and in very rich
economies. It is the intermediate class of economies where under-migration
is possible.
In the last section we look at the dynamics of the economy. The picture
that emerges complements the results just described; more generally, pat-
terns of the inequality dynamics and of modernization do depend somewhat
sensitively on parametric specification, suggesting that Kuznets curves and
full modernization should not be expected to be universal phenomena.. It
is possible to find conditions under which there is a tendency toward full
transition to a modern economy, although the pace of modernization will be
too slow. Such economies will display the full Kuznets phenomenon, defined
as full modernization combined with the inverted U pattern of evolution of
inequality. On the other hand, rural economies which are opened to already
populated urban sectors give rise to the possibility of abortive or partial mod-
ernization, and exogenous shocks may have a role in determining whether or
not modernization takes place. Finally, we can provide theoretical justifica-
tion for the empirical ambiguity of the Kuznets hypothesis, by making small
changes to the basic model. Simply by changing the timing of agents' lo-
cation decisions — specifically, by allowing them to relocate after learning
their productivity rather than before — one can, through selection effects,
generate economies in which the evolution of inequality follows an upright
U: inequality decreases, then increases during the modernization process, in
effect turning Kuznets on his head.
2 The Model
To make these ideas precise we consider a simple model with just two possible
locations — a single village representing the traditional sector and a single
city representing modernity. The economy has a single storable consumption
good which may also be as capital. The biography of a typical individual goes
as follows. At the beginning of his life, an individual receives an inheritance
from his parent, who bequeaths a portion j3 of his income. With this initial
wealth a in hand, the child makes his location choice, which has no direct
rural areas — and their absence in cities — contribute to undermigration problems in
India.
cost — labor is freely mobile. In his youth, before entering his productive
phase, the individual has a chance p of suffering a utility loss «s which may
be offset by consuming m < s units of the good (think of illness and cure);
without the loss, extra consumption at this phase of life yields no utility.
Finally, in adulthood, the individual earns his income from labor, which he
supplies inelastically. The von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences have the
form y — pi, (so the agent is risk-neutral in income t/), and I denotes the
utility loss from illness, which is either s if m is not consumed, or 0 if it is.
The first crucial assumption is that productivity is higher in the city than
in the village. We model this by assuming that an individual who can earn
w in his village could earn An; in the city, where A > 1. In a first-best world,
where information was not at issue, everyone could borrow and lend at the
market gross interest rate r (the only reason to borrow would be to finance
the medicine). Thus every individual would move to the city, purchase the
medicine at a price r, enjoy a utility of Xw + (a — prn)r,7 and the economy
would operate efficiently.
But this is not a first-best world, and this fact affects the workings of
the market for consumption loans. We assume that capital is freely mobile
between the two locations. What is not mobile is information and enforce-
ment powers. The consumption loan/insurance market is distinguished by
the possibility that a borrower might renege on a debt.8 To abstract from
bankruptcy issues, assume for the moment that labor income is high enough
to insure that borrowers can afford repayment. Suppose an agent puts up all
of his wealth a (the maximum he can provide) as collateral and borrows an
amount L. When it comes time to repay the loan, he may attempt to avoid
his obligations by fleeing from the purview of the lender and disappearing
into the urban crowds, albeit at the cost of lost collateral or. The borrower
succeeds in escaping attempts at recovering the loan with probability TT, in
which case he enjoys a net income of y, having avoided paying Lr; with prob-
ability 1 — TT he is caught before he has a chance to dispose of his income and
a maximal punishment is imposed which holds his lifetime income to zero.
Reneging therefore yields a payoff of TH/, while repaying yields y — Lr + ar\
7Since illness only occurs with probability p, this expression can be interpreted as saying
either that with probability p, the agent buys ra, or that he pays pm before he knows his
health, receiving m only if he is sick. Below, these interpretations will not be equivalent,
and we shall prefer the latter.
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 This model of an imperfect loan market is very similar to that studied by Kehoe-Levine
[11] and Banerjee-Newman [4].
the borrower will renege whenever (1 — 7r)y 4- ar < Lr. Knowing this, lenders
will only make loans that satisfy (1 — 7r)y 4- ar > Dr. All loans made in
equilibrium will satisfy this constraint, and the borrower will never renege.
Since the agent needs exactly m to recover from illness and pm to cover an
insurance premium that will cover this need, his initial wealth must satisfy
a > pm — (1 — 7r)y/r if he is to borrow at all; if his wealth is below this
threshold value, he will be unable to pay for the medication. Observe that
this threshold value of wealth is increasing in the interest rate, decreasing
in income, and increasing in the escape probability TT, SO that this model
provides a simple if perhaps extreme model of an imperfect loan market
which accords in its conclusions with those of other agency models.
We now use this model to distinguish the informational advantage of
the village over the city. Specifically, we make the extreme assumption that
escape is impossible if one is born and remains in the village: TT = 0 there, so
that the threshold wealth is pm — w/r = av(w, r): as long as the individual's
wage in the village exceeds pmr, she can borrow and insure against illness.
If however, one locates in the city (either by choice or by birth), TT is large in
the sense that A(l — TT) < 1; thus, ac(w, r) = pm — (1 — ir)\w/r > av(w, r)
for all w and r.
This market imperfection is the source of the possibility of undermigra-
tion: an individual whose wealth lies between the threshold values ac(w, r)
and av(w, r) would indeed gain a higher wage by migrating, but would be
giving up the possibility of insuring himself. (Note that it is never socially
or individually optimal for someone born in the city to move to the country,
because he faces the same value of IT but earns a lower income.) It remains
to see whether this possibility is compatible with competitive equilibrium.
3 Static Equilibrium
Normalize the population of adults in the world in any period to be of
Lebesgue measure 1. Denote by R(a) the measure of people born in the
village with wealth less than a at the beginning of the period. Denote by
U{a) the corresponding measure in the city.
Let us now consider the choice problem faced by the those who grew up
in the rural sector. Given an interest rate r, an agent with a > ac{w, r) has a
payoff of w—pmr 4- ar if he stays in the village and Xw —pmr 4- ar if he moves
to the city, so he clearly will migrate. If his wealth is less than ay (w, r), he
will also migrate because he doesn't get insurance in either location and so
takes the higher urban wage. An agent with wealth between ac{w,r) and
av(w, r) however, will migrate only if w — pmr + car < Xw — ps + or, i.e.
s /^ \\w
if r > = f(w). What this tells us then, is that migration will
m pm
tend to be carried out by the relatively wealthy and by those for whom the
market interest rate exceeds r(w); since this is a decreasing function of w, it
is those with the highest incomes (e.g. the most skilled) who will migrate.
Finally, very poor low-skilled people may also migrate — this requires that
their skill levels are low enough to make ay(w, r) positive; if not, even agents
with zero wealth will be able to borrow for insurance and will remain in the
village.
To summarize, we have
Proposition 1 An agent born in the village with wealth a and who earns w
there migrates to the city when the interest rate is r only if (a) a > ac{w, r)
or (b) r > r(w) or (c) a < av(w,r).
As we have already noted, those who grew up in the urban sector never
have reason to migrate to the village. See Figure 1 (w(r) is the inverse of
r(w), i.e. the income level at which an agent is indifferent between staying
in the village with insurance and moving to the city without it).
Given this proposition, the supply and demand for loans can be char-
acterized very simply. For the remainder of this section we assume that
everyone earns the same income (equivalently, we may assume that no one
learns his income, which is independent of initial wealth, until after he has
made his location decision, while the opportunity to renege occurs after locat-
ing but before income is earned — this will be the preferred interpretation
in the next section), so that agents only differ in initial wealth; thus we
might as well write ac(r) and ay{r) for ac(w, r) and av(w, r) evaluated at
this common value of w, and r for f(w). All of those with wealth above
ac(r) demand loans, as do those with wealth less than ac(r) who remain
in the village. If the interest rate is greater than r, everyone migrates, so
the demand for loans is pm[l — R(ac(r) — U(ac(r))], which is decreasing
s s s
(at r = —,the demand is the interval [0,pmll — RiaA—) — U(ac(—))11).
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At r, those villagers with wealth below ac(r) but above ay(r) are in-
different between the two locations, so the demand becomes an interval
\pm[l — R(ac(r)) — U(ac(r))],pm[l — R(av(r)) — U(ac(r))]]; as r declines
further demand becomes pm[l — R(ay(r)) — U(ac(r))], eventually reaching
its maximum value of pm. Supply is simply the aggregate wealth a. Thus
equilibrium, if it exists, is generically unique.9 It is straightforward to check
that the maximum equilibrium gross interest rate is s/m, while because the
good is storable, the minimum is 1.
Figure 2 illustrates the situation. Also shown are the demand functions
which would result in the first-best case without information problems (this
is also the demand function for a pure village economy in which there was
no urban sector to migrate to), and the demand from a pure urban economy
(say one in which everyone was forced to move to the city).
We can now check whether the equilibrium level of migration is efficient
in the sense of making full use of the existing supply of resources. In par-
ticular we shall ask whether social surplus could be increased relative to its
equilibrium level by forcing agents to choose locations in some way other
than the one which occurs in equilibrium. Thus we shall not be concerned
here with the possibility of increases in social surplus which might be ob-
tained from interventions in the loan market or from tax and transfer schemes
more generally. We should also note at this point that, as is often the case
in economies in which incentives and wealth effects play a role, the poten-
tial surplus increases under discussion cannot typically be transformed into
Pareto improvements.
On the face of it, we should expect that any situation where some agents
remain in the rural sector is a candidate for inefficiency. To see this, note
that labor in the rural sector is being used inefficiently. If a small number
of people were moved to the urban sector, more income would be generated.
This reduces the demand for loans however, but if the interest rate is able
to fall, the capital that is no longer being used in the rural sector can flow
to the city, clearing the market at a lower interest rate, as shown in Figure
2.10
The next step is to determine whether and under what conditions an
inefficient equilibrium actually exists. Figure 3 illustrates the level of mi-
9Existence is guaranteed if R(-) and £/(•) are continuous. With such distribution func-
tions, the only case of nonuniqueness occurs when a = pm, in which case we focus on the
equilibrium in which r = 1, which is the one that maximizes the level of migration and
social surplus.
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 This does not say that the optimal allocation has everyone moving to the urban sector,
since if the interest rate cannot fall enough, some of the wealth would be consumed rather
than used for insurance. This will be clarified below.
gration as a function of the equilibrium interest rate. Clearly a necessary
condition for inefficiency is that the equilibrium r be no higher than r. Since
1 is the lowest equilibrium value of r, a necessary condition for the existence
of inefficient undermigration is
p(s-m) > (X-l)w. (1)
This condition is quite plausible. If the productivity differential between
village and city is large (A is large), then the attraction of the city is enough
to swamp the possible lack of insurance, and everyone migrates. By the same
token, if the value of insurance is small (s is close to ra), undermigration is
unlikely, since poor people have little to lose by leaving their village.
As is evident from Figure 2, the existence of inefficient undermigration
depends in part on the mean level of wealth. But it also it depends on the
higher moments of the wealth distribution. A complete characterization for
continuous distributions of wealth is offered in the following
Proposition 2 Suppose condition (1) holds and R(-) and U(-) are continu-
ous. Then the level of migration is inefficient if and only if (a) 1 —R(av(l))~
U(ac{l)) > - ^ and (b) - ^ > [1 - R{ac{r)) - U(ac{r))].
Proof. First, suppose that conditions (a) and (b) hold. Condition (a)
ensures that the equilibrium interest rate r* is greater than one, while Con-
dition (b) implies that at least some agents remain in the rural sector. There
are now two cases. If < 1 — R(ac(l)) — U(ac(l)), then moving all people
pm
to the urban sector raises output (because they are more productive) without
changing the surplus from insurance, because the loan market will now clear
at a new interest rate lower than r*. Thus, surplus increases, and the original
level of migration was inefficient. If instead > 1 — R(ac(l)) — U(ac(^)),
pm
one can increase surplus by requiring [1 — R(ac(l)) — U(ac(l))] agents
pm
with wealth less than ac(l) (this quantity is less than R(ac(^)) — R(av(l))
by Condition (a)) to stay in the village and sending everyone else to the city;
this clears the insurance market at r = 1 and increases output by increasing
the number of people in the city.
Conversely, suppose that (a) fails to hold, i.e. that r* = 1. Then moving
anyone from the village to the city increases output, but they will now be
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unable to get a loan since the interest rate cannot fall (their wealth must
be less than ac(l) or they already would have moved); by (1) this entails a
net loss of surplus. If (b) fails, then as we have seen, everyone migrates, so
equilibrium is efficient. •
This proposition is the central result of this section. It helps to shed light
on exactly what the rural institution is doing. Clearly, since in the initial
equilibrium there are people who choose to remain in the traditional sector,
they are paying less in interest in the traditional sector than they would in the
modern sector (more precisely, they are getting loans there that they would
not get in the modern sector). In other words, the rural credit institution
does facilitate borrowing. On the other hand if they were moved to the
modern sector the wealth they were using would not lay fallow. Somebody
will end up using it and now it will be used in the more productive modern
sector. The interest rate will fall to make this possible; in other words the
rural credit institution creates inefficiency by allowing the interest rate to
be set too high relative to its second-best level (it will typically be too low
relative to its first-best level).
One special case deserves to be underscored. If the economy is wealthy
in the sense that a > pm, migration is always efficient (condition (a) is
violated in this case). Since, as we have said, poor economies will tend to
have efficient migration as well (although this is not necessary), it is the
middling economies, where the villagers have something to lose but wealth
is not yet so plentiful as to render the urban agency problems nugatory, that
are the best candidates for inefficient undermigration.
Observe that the falling interest rate which results from a policy of forced
migration will hurt net lenders (which may include very poor agents as well
as the very wealthy); the beneficiaries would tend to be those at the middling
wealth levels. We are currently investigating whether suitably designed taxes
and transfers can turn the surplus increase into a Pareto improvement.
One possibility which we have not so far discussed is that of overmigra-
tion, an evident problem in many countries today. In the present model,
overmigration exists when the aggregate wealth a is less than prn, but the
loan market fails to clear, i.e. even at an interest rate of unity there is more
wealth than is demanded for use as insurance. Now, while this won't be pos-
sible under laissez-faire (if r = 1, anyone who moved to the city who doesn't
have a loan there would be better off staying in his village; the capital would
flow to him there, and condition (1) implies he would be better off), it is
possible that catastrophes such as the Bengal famine in the 1940's would
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have the effect of forcing sudden movement to the city with concomitant
dissolution of the rural information networks. Suppose that the condition
> 1 — R(ac(X)) — U(ac(l)) mentioned in the proof of Proposition 2
pm
holds. Then we would have a situation in which everyone (say) was in the
city, but a fair amount of them (more than is necessary given the amount
of wealth in the economy) were uninsured, so that much of the economy's
wealth would be "idle," i.e., consumed rather than used for insurance. Thus,
while forced migration might have desirable consequences if there are not
too many villagers who are poor (have wealth less than ac(l)), the opposite
may be true if there are too many of them; an optimum would then involve
keeping some of those people in the rural sector.11
To summarize, if the urban sector is suddenly opened to a very poor econ-
omy, there should be full migration (the interest rate is likely to be higher
than r). Only if the rural economy has a sufficiently high aggregate wealth
is undermigration likely to be a problem. The degree of undermigration will
depend not only on the aggregate level of wealth but also on its distribu-
tion. For instance, if the distribution is fairly inegalitarian while the mean
is reasonably high, R(ac(r)) is likely to be large, so that it is quite easy for
undermigration to occur. The general point to note here is that the wealth
distribution in the two sectors is the state variable which tells us, among
other things, how many people migrate. Thus if we can generate an account
of the dynamics of the wealth distribution, we will also have generated the
rate of migration endogenously.
4 Some Rudimentary Dynamics
Our main interest is in the transitional dynamics of an economy. Specifically,
starting with a pure rural economy, we wish to examine the level of migration
and the distribution of labor earnings over time after the urban sector is
opened. A full analysis of the global dynamics of the model is beyond the
scope of this paper (this is partly for technical reasons — see [4]), so we
limit ourselves to a few special cases which nevertheless illustrate how the
migration dynamics can lead to a variety of patterns of the evolution of
11
 The optimal allocations of people across sectors are the ones used in the proof of
Proposition 2. Of course, all of this discussion presupposes that interventions in the loan
market or direct redistributions of wealth are not possible.
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inequality.
In order to study the dynamics in the simplest possible way, we need to
elaborate a bit on the timing and preferences used in the previous sections.
Suppose that during an agent's life (that is in the course of one period) there
are five dates. At date 0, the agent inherits his wealth; at date 1 he chooses
his location and engages in the insurance contract; uncertainty about the
utility loss is resolved at date 2; agents earn twice in their lifetimes, at dates
3 and 4, and also consume at those dates.
The agent consumes for the first time after earning a wage and repaying
any loans (below we shall make assumptions to guarantee that repayments
can be made out of a single date's earnings). He then earns the (same level)
wage again and splits this income between consumption and a bequest to his
child. Utility is
where c$ and c± are the consumption levels at dates 3 and 4; 6 is the bequest;
/ = 0 if the insurance is purchased, and s if it is not; and a < 1. If the agent
earns y at each date, then this yields the indirect utility (1 4- S)y 4- or — pmr
(or (1 4- S)y 4- or — ps if he doesn't obtain the insurance loan) where 6 =
Notice that with these preferences, consumption at the date 3 has greater
utility than consumption at date 4. This introduces the possible need for a
second consumption-loan market, distinct from the insurance-loan market:
agents have an incentive to borrow against fourth-date earnings in order to
consume at the third date. Equilibrium in this consumption-loan market
would entail that the gross interest rate there be equal to 1/6. One equilib-
rium allocation — the one we shall focus on exclusively — has each agent
consuming date-3 earnings net of insurance repayments at date 3, and split-
ting date-4 earnings between date-4 consumption and the bequest; in par-
ticular, there is no borrowing and lending between dates. This is the unique
symmetric allocation and the only one that would be compatible with even
a slight imperfection in the consumption loan market.
Under these assumptions, the bequest, which is identical to the offspring's
initial wealth, is equal to (3y, provided that y is large enough to cover any
loan repayments. This specification of preferences, earnings levels and the
consumption loan market yields exactly the same one-period behavior that
we saw in the previous sections, assuming that agents who are caught after
reneging on loans are subject only to having their date-3 income confiscated,
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while their date-4 income is inappropriable.12 Moreover, it greatly simplifies
the analysis of the dynamics; in particular, the information contained in the
distribution of wealth in each location is summarized by the single number
R denoting the fraction of the population in the rural sector. Since our
purpose is to illustrate the variety of possible dynamic behavior generated
by migration (as distinct from wealth accumulation, which has been studied
by many authors), rather than to make strong predictions, we feel justified
in imposing this structure.
Finally, for what follows we need to distinguish between two alternative
assumptions about when an agent's skill becomes known (to himself and the
public alike). In one case, this information is not learned until date 3; in the
second it is learned between dates 0 and 1.
4.1 Full Modernization and the Kuznets curve
Suppose first that agents learn their skill level after choosing a location (to be
precise, at date 3), so that their decisions correspond to the one-wage case
alluded to in Section 3. Let that the distribution of skills (corresponding
to village labor earnings) be F(w), which is supported on a nondegenerate
interval \w_, W\ with density f{w), mean w, and variance <72. The distribution
of earnings among those in the city is then F(^)-
In order to guarantee that agents repay loans out of date-3 earnings alone,
we need to assume that ^ > ps ( ps is the largest possible value of pmr,
since r < s/m.) Notice that this implies that the fraction of villagers born
with wealth less than ay(r) is always zero ( the largest value of av(-) is
pm — - ^ < pm — jr^ < prn — - ^ = 0): villagers can always insure. We
are only interested in case in which average wealth a is less than pm, since
in the other case modernization is instantaneous. Thus we assume that (3 is
small enough that /3w < pm.
For ease of computation, we use the coefficient of variation as an inequality
measure. Suppose that in period t the population of the rural sector at the
beginning of the period (i.e. before the location decisions) is Rt~, then the
urban population is 1—Rf. This will serve as the state variable; we don't need
to consider any higher dimensional objects such as the wealth distribution:
12If one assumes instead that lifetime income can be held to zero, the expressions for
a
c(r) a n ( i a>v{r) become pm — (l-+-6)(l — 7r)\w/r and pm — (l + S)w/r ; this is essentially
inconsequential for the analysis but requires some cumbersome modification of notation.
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since an agent whose income realization is w and who remains in the village
in period t—1 bequeaths /3w to his child, the fraction of the rural population
at the beginning of period t with wealth less than x is given by RtF(^); the
urban wealth distribution is just (1 — Rt)F(j^).
The distribution of wages in the economy in period t is then given by
Rt+\F{w) 4- (1 — Rt+i)F(™) (by our notational convention, Rt+i is the rural
population after people choose their locations and so represents the relevant
population for computing the distribution of incomes). One can readily check
that inequality is equal to J when R = 0 or 1, is increasing at 0, decreasing
at 1, and has a (unique) maximum at R = j ^ ,13 Since mean income Rw +
(1 — R)\w is decreasing in R, if we can show that Rt decreases monotonically
from 1 to 0, assuming at least one interior value along the way, we will have
shown that the economy follows the inverted-U curve as it develops.14
We note first that the level of migration (i.e. Rt — Rt+i), as shown in
Figure 3, is nonnegative — no one ever migrates from the city to the village.
Thus Rt does indeed follow a monotonic path. But in order to guarantee that
the inverted-U relation is generated by the economy's dynamics, we must also
show that (a) the economy fully modernizes (that is, Rt converges to 0), and
(b) it does so in more that one period (otherwise inequality remains at ^ for
all time).
From Figure 3, a lower bound for the level of migration is given by R(oo) —
R(ac(r)); this in turn is bounded below by Rt(l — F{?^p- -f pmr)). Thus,
if w > ?^p- + pmr, there is a uniform positive lower bound on the fraction
of the rural population that will migrate each period, and it follows that Rt
converges to zero.
Next, we need to ensure that the economy does not modernize instantly.
Note (again refer to Figure 3) that if the interest rate is r upon opening the
urban sector, then not everyone migrates in the first period, except in the
singular case in which pm[l — R{acif))\ = (3w. This is equivalent to the
13These properties can be established using the expression for the coefficient of variation,
which is
I[R + (1- R)\2](<r2+w2) ~
y [R + (\-R)\]2w2
where R G [0,1].
14Apparently, the idea that a monotonic increase in the urban population leads to this
inverted-U relation between income and the coefficient of variation is known (see [8]),
although there the rate of migration is left unexplained.
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condition that ^ > 1 - F ( ^ ) . 1 5 Thus we have
pm \ p '
Proposition 3 Ifw > ^ , m > ps, and g| > l - F ( ^ ) , then ast-*oo,
Rt ~* 0 f i^e economy fully modernizes) and the path of inequality and income
follows an inverted- U curve.
Notice that although the economy fully modernizes, it does so too slowly
— even if full modernization takes only finite time,16 any discounted sum
of single-period social surpluses would be increased if modernization were to
occur immediately as the modern sector opens.
The modernization process in this model operates at two levels. When full
modernization occurs, it is because some positive fraction of rural agents are
always successful enough to pass on a large bequest to their children, who can
then afford to insure themselves in the modern sector. This is an individual
level effect which depends on primitive assumptions about the distribution
of earnings. But there is also a "trickle-down" effect which operates at a
more aggregate level: as people move to the city, they earn more, aggregate
wealth increases, while demand for insurance typically does not increase.
This leads to a decrease in the interest rate, thereby lowering everyone's
cost of insurance. In particular borrowing in the city becomes easier at the
lowered interest rate, which in turn make the modern sector more attractive.
A related trickle-down mechanism is discussed in [2]
In a parallel way, increasing wealth in the modern sector mollifies the ef-
fects of poor information there. For an individual, having a lot of wealth im-
proves his borrowing prospects. And as the whole economy becomes wealthy,
falling interest rates lower the agency costs of borrowing for everybody. Thus,
there is a dual sense in which a wealthy economy can to a certain extent afford
to do without good information.
15
 It is not hard to find distributions which satisfy this condition. Start with a mean wage
w > ps and the Dirac distribution there. Choose 0 large enough to render aa£> > w and
(3w < pm. Now spread the Dirac distribution in a mean-preserving way to keep its support
in \ps, acg ]. Now, through mean-preserving spreads, generate a continuous distribution
G{w) with support equal to [ps, ^^}. Since G{^^) = 1, g | > 1 - G{^p). Now let
F be a mean-preserving spread of G which puts (a small) positive weight above acgJ,
preserving the condition.
l6For instance, if A is large enough, mean wealth may exceed pm in finite time, which
as we have seen, then leads immediately to full modernization.
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4.2 Undermigration in the Long Run
What if the conditions of Proposition 3 are not satisfied? Is it possible that
a long-run version of undermigration can occur, i.e. that the economy could
settle into a steady state in which some people inefficiently remain in the
rural sector?
If the economy is to get stuck in an undermigration trap, both the in-
dividual and trickle-down effects have to mitigated. We first begin by dis-
pensing with the assumption that w > ac^r>
 ? which weakens the first effect,
and is necessary if there is not to be full modernization; thus w < ac^>
and F(ac!jr') = 1. We continue to assume that /3w < pm, as this is also a
necessary condition for undermigration, as discussed above.
We shall be interested in deriving the recursion function for the state
variable Rt, the rural population at the beginning of the period t. Denoting
the current interest rate by rt, the rural population evolves according to:
rt<?
, rt = f
0, rt>r
(2)
Of course, this is not yet a proper characterization of dynamics, because rt
itself depends on Rt through the insurance market equilibrium. The insur-
ance loan market equilibrium can be characterized very simply, however. The
supply of loans each period is /3w[Rt + (1 — -&t)A]. Demand is
pm[l - (1 - /yF(2£fcl)], rt<f
pm(l - ^[1 - F(^)], rt>f
From these expressions, one can verify that r is increasing in R when rt < f.
Now observe that for all R G [0,1], G(R) < R, since migration never
goes from city to village. Since G(R) > 0 by definition, we conclude that
£7(0) = 0.
We now need to establish the existence of fixed points of G(-) other than
zero. Suppose that R* is such a fixed point. Then from (2) the associated
interest rate r* must satisfy F(a°^ ') = 1 and r* < r. Suppose there is a fixed
point (call it R ) associated with the interest rate f. As this is a stationary
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point, there can be no migration at when R = R. Therefore we must have
supply exactly equated to the highest level of demand generated by r (refer
back to Figures 2 and 3). Hence,
pw[R + (1 - R)\\ = pm[\ - (1 - R)F(^)}. (3)
Now choose R* below R. The corresponding equilibrium interest rate r*
must also lie below r (supply increases while demand decreases). So long
as F(a°^ ') = 1, R* is also a fixed point of G(-). Indeed, there will be an
interval (possibly degenerate) of fixed points [R, R], where the interest rate
r associated with R satisfies ac{r) = (3w- Thus we need only establish the
existence of a solution to (3) in order to guarantee that G(-) has stationary
points bounded away from zero.17
Solving (3) for R yields
pm t f l A/? / *
this expression lies in the allowable range if and only if ^ ^ ^^(xg) — 1 > 0-
It is not hard to find parameter values for which this condition holds. Thus
we have
Proposition 4 Suppose that ^ + F(^f-) - 1 > 0. Then there exists an
interval [R, R] of rural population levels which remain constant over time
once the economy arrives there.
Since R > 0, at least some of these levels are positive: full modernization
does not occur. We therefore refer to the interval [R, R] as the "undermigra-
tion trap."
How might the economy actually arrive in an undermigration trap? We
could start by returning to our original question and asking whether long-
run undermigration is possible starting from a pure rural economy. Figure 4
17For R > R, the interest rate remains at r. Raising R decreases supply and raises the
upper bound of demand at r, so the interest rate cannot falL On the other hand, if r rises,
it must satisfy
pm(l - R)[l - F{^-)] = 3w[R+(l - R)\};
solutions to this equation are decreasing in R, a contradiction.
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illustrates possible shapes that G(R) might assume, given that the undermi-
gration trap exists. As noted in footnote 17 above, when R > R, the interest
rate is r. Thus, G(R) is linear there and can have either slope, depending on
the sign of £jj(l - A) + 1 - F(2£j£l). If the slope is positive (Figure 4(a)),
then an economy starting at R = 1 will converge to R; income inequality will
increase over time, perhaps decreasing a small amount toward the end (the
so-called inverted J-curve).
But for most parameter values the slope will be negative (see Figure 4(b)).
Thus the only way a pure rural economy would fall into the undermigration
trap is if (2(1) = ^ > R : as shown in Figure 4(b), when this condition
is satisfied, the economy jumps to the undermigration trap as soon as the
urban sector opens. If this condition fails, the economy jumps past the
undermigration trap when the urban sector opens and then eventually fully
modernizes (Figure 4(c)). In these cases, trickle-down remains strong enough
to eventually modernize the economy.
We have been asking whether long run undermigration is possible assum-
ing that the economy starts out a purely rural. This is a useful thought
experiment, but is not necessarily the only relevant case. Many instances
of modernization and development, especially in modern times, correspond
to opening an already large urban sector to the rural sector. Thus initial
conditions with R < 1 are also of interest. As indicated in Figure 4(c), the
basin of attraction of the undermigration trap is considerably larger than
the trap itself, so a failure to modernize is reasonably likely: if the economy
begins with the size of the rural sector in the interval [R, R], it falls into the
trap. We therefore have a dynamic analogue to the conditions leading to
undermigration in the static case discussed in the previous section. Opening
a moderate-sized city to the village may not effect further development of
the economy, at least if one relies on the laissez-faire migration mechanism.
4.3 Other Dynamics with Self-Select ion
As we stated at the outset, there has been considerable controversy surround-
ing the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis. We have seen that it is possible
for the migratory dynamics generated by the trade-off between high mod-
ern sector productivity and efficient traditional sector institutions to yield
an inverted-U curve. What we show now, is that even if we maintain the
same basic "engine" of modernization that Kuznets and Lewis described, it
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is possible under plausible specifications to generate rather different patterns
for the evolution of inequality. In particular, the way individuals select for
migration will be crucial for the pattern of the evolution of inequality.
Suppose that agents learn the level of their earnings between dates 0 and
1, before they make their location decision. Assume this information is public.
Then each period, migration follows the pattern described by Proposition 1
and Figure 1. In particular, note that low-skill agents migrate while medium-
skill agents remain in the rural sector. Imagine that the low-skilled in the
city actually end up earning close to what the medium-skilled are earning
back in the village. Then, assuming the fraction of very high-skill agents
(those who migrate even though they could get insurance in the rural sector)
is small, the possibility arises that opening the urban sector could actually
decrease the level of inequality; subsequently, as the rural sector empties
out, inequality increases again. The result is an "upright" U, rather than
Kuznets's inverted U.
To see how this mechanism operates, suppose that there are just two
skill levels, w and Xw (these are the earnings of an agent in the village; in
the city he would earn Aw and X2w). An agent's chance of having the high
skill is q, assumed independent of the wealth he inherits. Make the following
parametric assumptions:
(A + P)w >ps-{X- l)Xw (4)
p(s — m)>(X- l)Xw (5)
Xwpm(3w>pm —— (6)ps — (A — l)Xw
pm — w> X(3w (7)
Assumption (4) ensures that high-skill agents in the rural sector can repay
loans at date 3 when the interest rate is r(Xw); (5) is the analog of (1)
and ensures that inefficient undermigration is possible; (6) implies that the
high-skill agents always have enough wealth to obtain insurance (i.e., their
wealth, which is at least /3w, exceeds ay(Xw,f) ), while (7) ensures that the
low-skill agents are below av(w, 1) and therefore always migrate.18 Under
these assumptions, there will be just two wealth levels before the urban
sector opens, viz., /3w and f3Xw. Figure 5, which is just Figure 1 specialized
18It is not difficult to find parameters satisfying (4)-(7). For instance, A = 2, w = 1,
p = 0.5, m = 3, s = 8, 0 = 0.2.
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to the current example, depicts the possible wealth-wage combinations that
can occur in as the economy evolves. Before the modern sector opens, wages
are either w or Xw, and wealth always lies somewhere below (3Xw (so wealth-
wage pairs lie on the heavy segments).19 Note that by choosing TTC sufficiently
close to 1, one can guarantee that the high-skill agents born in the village
will be unable to obtain insurance in the city (i.e., their wealth will lie below
ac(Xw,r) for allr).
Assumption (7) ensures that as long some of the population remains in
the rural sector, a positive fraction q of their children will be born poor
and low-skilled enough to migrate. Eventually, therefore, the economy fully
modernizes. Observe that in this example, in contrast to those considered
in the previous subsections, it is the low types who migrate; modernization
comes from below rather than above (more generally, as we have pointed out,
it tends to come from the tails of the distribution, not the middle).
In any period, only two wages are earned: either w and Xw or Xw and
X2w. Thus, if p is the fraction of the population earning the higher wage, the
coefficient of variation is ^-—x+1_ » which achieves a unique maximum at
p = 3^-j. The initial distribution of wages has q at Xw and 1 — q at w; since
there is full modernization, eventually the distribution approaches q at X2w
and 1 — q at Xw. Thus, inequality is the same at the start and end of the
development process.
Now consider the periods in between. As the urban sector opens, the low-
skill agents migrate to the city, where they earn Xw. They pass on bequests of
(3Xw; their children will earn either Xw or A2w, bequeathing j3Xw and (3X2w.
Meanwhile, the children of the high-skilled agents who remain in the village
inherit wealth /3Xw and skill w or Xw. From these considerations, there are
five possible wealth-wage pairs that can occur once the modern sector is
opened (but before location choices are made); these are denoted by the X's
in Figure 5.
For certain levels of q20 market clearing entails that r = f(Xw) and that
19Without actuaHy calculating any particular distribution of wealth —such as a steady
state — for the pure rural economy (unlike in sections 4.1 and 4.2, this computation is
complicated by the fact that under the parametric assumptions (4)-(7), at interest rates
larger than r(Xw), loans cannot necessarily be repaid out of date-3 earnings alone ), it is
not hard to verify that an upper bound for any agent's wealth is (3Xw, since from what
we said at the beginning of the section, Xw is the most that an agent would have at date
4 from which to produce a bequest.
20Specifically, maximum demand at f(\w), qpm, must exceed supply [qX 4- 1 — q]/3w;
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some (call the fraction r) of the high-skill agents also migrate (the demand
and supply functions for this case are shown in Figure 6).21 Suppose that q =
- ^ ; after the urban sector opens we have qr at X2w and 1 — qr at Xw. Since
q = j^rj yields the maximum level of inequality , we find that in this case
that the initial impact of the development process is to decrease inequality.
As before, let Rt denote the beginning-of-period-£ rural population. As t
increases, Rt decreases monotonically to zero; the supply of wealth is there-
fore increasing. Demand, meanwhile, cannot increase above its maximum
initial level qpm, since only high-skill agents (whether rural or urban) can
exceed the respective threshold wealth levels. Therefore, interest rates can-
not increase over time. If the interest rate in some period t is less than
r(Xw), the fraction of the population earning the high wage is q{\ — Rt),
which increases with time. With q = j ^ , this implies that inequality must
increase over time as well.22 In the limit as the economy evolves toward full
modernization, inequality returns to its initial level: the path of inequality
follows an upright U, contrary to Kuznets's hypothesis.
Essentially the same conclusion holds if initially market clearing occurs
at r = 1 (i.e., when q fails to satisfy condition (8)), in which case none of
the high-skill migrate in the first period. Then everyone earns Xw: there
is perfect equality (p = 0) as soon as the modern sector opens. Then a
similar argument gives us a monotonic increase of p back to its initial level.
Inequality then traces out an upright U, at least if A/? < I.23




 The figure is drawn supposing that there are just two wealth levels at the time the
city opens; the key point is that a finite number is typical. Readers may be bothered by
the discontinuity in the demand which results from the atoms in the wage distribution. If
instead the distribution was atomless and supported on two small intervals centered about
w and Xw, then demand would be continuous and the interest rates would always assume
values very close to f, 7*1, and r% depicted in the diagram. The present example can be
thought of as an approximation to that case. (Of course, by (7) r\ and r% are less than 1,
so equilibrium always exists in the first period after the city opens; but the approximation
is valid more generally.)
22In case r remains at f(Xw), the fraction of high wage earners is still increasing over
time, but the argument is slightly more complicated, and we omit it.
23If not, then if q > j ^y , inequality will overshoot its final (and original) level before
declining back to it, thereby following a "slanting S."
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For other values of q, however, the initial impact of opening the modern
sector can lead to an increase in inequality, a la Kuznets. To take an extreme
example, suppose that q is nearly equal to 1 (so there is nearly perfect equality
to begin with). Then the interest rate following the opening of the modern
sector will be r(Xw). A large fraction of the rural population migrates and
earns the high wage X2w: inequality has increased.24 Eventually, of course,
everyone will end up in the city, so inequality will have to decline to its
original level, yielding the inverted U.
5 Conclusion
The implications of the dynamic examples studied in section 4.3 may be
summarized by saying that characteristics of those who choose to migrate
have important implications for the evolution of inequality in developing
economies. Moreover, the dynamics of inequality, as the example there shows,
can depend delicately on parameters of the distribution of these character-
istics. We conclude that there is no theoretical reason — even if we adhere
to the migration-as-engine-of-development story — to believe in the inverted
U.
More generally, the conclusion of this study is that the intuitions from the
older literature on migration and development may still be relevant as long
as we view them through the lens of the appropriate model. The empirical
failures of the Lewis and Kuznets models were at least as much a result of
naive modelling as they were of the failure of the basic stories.
We should like to point out that our model is open to somewhat broader
interpretation. It has been noted that in many developing countries (as
well to some extent among immigrant communities in developed countries),
that migrants to cities often reproduce the social networks formerly held in
their original villages. However, this does not invalidate the model. On the
contrary, an agent's membership in a traditional social network is costly.
Indeed, full engagement in the modern sector may require participation in
a different network, or mobility (often cited as one of the reasons for the
higher productivity of the modern sector) which makes maintenance of close
social ties impossible. Thus close spatial proximity of the traditional and
24With q close to 1, the fraction of the population which migrates and receives X2w
upon the opening of the modern sector is close to 1 — A^|; using (7), this exceeds j ^ .
Noting that inequality is decreasing on [j^, 1] proves the claim.
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modern sectors (say, in the city) does not necessarily imply that agents can
adequately participate in both. The result is that the patterns of income
and inequality generated by our model are still valid, although they need not
manifest themselves in the pattern of migration: even if everyone does move
from village to city, the economy will still be slow to modernize.
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